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Abstract 
The questions posed for study are motivated by controversies over how Sweden might change 
from a centralized system of railroad management to a decentralized system. The central rail 
administration, Banverk, will retain ownership and maintenance responsibility of the tracks, but 
will sell access to the tracks to private firms. The questions are about the mechanism that might 
accomplish this task. Parties to the controversy have claimed that the technical aspects of 
networks will, as a matter of principle, preclude the operation of any decentralized method. This 
paper explores the properties of a mechanism developed as a challenge to that claim. The 
mechanism is examined in the context of a testbed experimental environment that contains many 
potential problem causing elements. In the tests performed the mechanism operated to efficiently 
allocate access to the network and it did so for behavioral reasons that are understandable in 
. terms of theory. The paper closes with suggestions for further study of environments that might 
present additional challenges to a mechanism. 
·A Bi?.ary Conflict Ascending Price (BICAP)
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1 .  INTRODUCTION 
The Swedish parliament1 has ordered its central rail administration, Banverket, to make 
the transition from a centrally allocated system to a market based system for the 
allocation of its railroads by 1995. In this partial privatization, Banverket will retain 
ownership and m aintenance responsibility for the tracks, and will sell access to the tracks 
to private firms. The questions posed for initial study here are motivated by the resulting 
controversy. If the government is to own the tracks, can competition be used to facilitate 
coordination and use among the many users of the track? Or, is it impossible as a matter 
of principle for a decentralized competitive process to allocate track time as efficiently as 
possible, that is, to those who value it most? If such allocations can be achieved through 
a competitive process, what might be the form of the process? 
Proponents of decentralization claim that substantial improvements in efficiency are 
possible. They point to specific features of the current allocation process that suggest 
inefficiency in operation and they claim that such problems would be avoided by a 
properly designed and decentralized market system. Opponents claim that existence of a 
decentralized mechanism yielding efficient allocation of a rail network has never been 
demonstrated. Furthermore, as is made clear by the following quote from a key 
• The financial support of the National Science Foundation and the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental 
Economics and Political Science is gratefully acknowledged. We wish to give a special acknowledgment 
to Jan-Eric Nilsson of the Center for Research in Transportation and Society, Borlange, Sweden for the 
information he provided on the industrial organization of railroads in Sweden and the current political 
environment. The comments of John Ledyard. Richard McKelvey, Scott Page. and Dave Porter have also 
been very helpful in the development of this project. 
1 In the budgetary bill of 1992 (prop.1991/92:100.suppl.7) the plans for reform were staled. See Nilsson 
(1991.1993). 
consulting report2, the critics of railway reform claim that decentralized decisions are 
not possible as a matter of principle: 
"These train paths cannot be treated as independent units, since they are not 
interchangeable, and depend on the specification of all other paths in the integrated 
timetable. There is therefore no common unit of capacity on a mixed-use railway which 
can be allocated to owners, priced and traded among a number of buyers and sellers." 
(p.291) 
"However, a simple free auction cannot be used for railway capacity since there are no 
independent units of capacity to.bid for. The viability of every bid to operate a train 
service depends on the specification of every other train service which has been bid for." 
(p.293) 
The strong positions for and against a market based system are the focus of the research. 
The primary goal of this research is not to solve the Swedish problem with a single study. 
Instead, the purpose is to explore questions posed by arguments advanced in the debate. 
The conclusion of this paper is a demonstration, via experimental methods, that 
decentralized mechanisms do exist that solve some of the types of technical and 
economic problems inherent in the railway allocation problem. The demonstration is, 
firstly, that the mechanism performs as desired under the circumstances tested and, 
secondly, that it passes a test of design consistency in the sense that it works according to 
behavioral principles that are consistent with the design. 
If the existence of an efficient, decentralized, allocation mechanism can be demonstrated 
operating in the laboratory for environments with technical economic complications of 
the rail allocation environment, then the argument that decentralization is impossible due 
to economic or technical principles has been refuted. In this sense, a demonstration 
provides a proof of principle or a proof of concept (Ledyard, 1993, Plott, 1994). Proof 
of principle does not mean that the mechanism will work to solve the Swedish problem, 
which involves additional complexities such as scale of operation, uncertainties, and 
politics. However, the demonstration sets the stage for future experiments in which 
additional problems can be examined and addressed, and the mechanism can be 
compared with other proposed mechanisms for private allocation of the rail network. 
Furthermore, design consistency tests create a presumption that the principles of behavior 
on which the process is built, are reliable and that the properties observed in the testbed 
can be presumed to be robust against simple parameter changes. Briefly put, the 
demonstration means that decentralized options for solving the Swedish problem cannot 
be dismissed immediately as being impossible or impractical, without further study. 
Section 2 provides background to the problem of efficient rail scheduling. Notation and 
concepts used throughout the paper are introduced there. Section 3 discusses the 
2 This report was prepared by the consulting firm Coopers & Lybrand and was published as an appendix
to a larger report by the Committee for Increased Competition Within the Railway Sector: Review of 
Proposals, January 1993. See: Okad Konkurrens pajarnvagen, SOU 1993:13. 
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technical problems faced by decentralization advocates by reference to the example 
introduced in Section 2. The section lists properties of a rail network that critics of 
decentralization claim will prevent the successful operation of decentralized allocation 
processes, as well as properties of the existing Swedish policies that advocates of 
decentralization suggest will be avoided by a decentralized process. Section 4 outlines 
the testbed environment that contains all of the properties listed in the previous section. 
The example initiated in Section 2 and continued in Section 3 becomes the testbed 
environment. Section 4 also contains other aspects of the experimental design and 
procedures. Section 5 outlines the mechanism to be applied to the environment and . 
Section 6 discusses some properties that will be used to evaluate the performance of the 
mechanism in the testbed. Section 7 presents the data and an analysis in terms of both 
the evaluative criteria and models of the behavior of the mechanism. Section 8 presents 
conclusions. 
2. BACKGROUND, NOTATION AND CONCEPTS
Figure 1 shows a map of the rail network in Sweden. Much of the track in outlying areas 
is single track, which, because of single tracks, cannot support simultaneous two-way 
traffic. Double track can be thought of as equivalent to two single tracks, and is typically 
used to provide bi-directional traffic flow. Gothenburg and Malmo are major seaports, 
and are connected to Stockholm by double track. Much of the rural areas have only 
single track. As can be seen, the network of rails is complex even though Sweden is a 
relatively small country, and it follows immediately that size, and complexity due to 
size, is a problem. 
Size is not the only problem and this paper will be focused on problems other than size. 
Much of the following section will be devoted to a discussion of a rail allocation problem 
that is trivial from a size perspective but, nevertheless, present a challenge to advocates 
of decentralization. 
Figure 2 shows a very simplified rail scheduling diagram for a hypothetical single track 
rail line. The vertical line has Stockholm at the bottom, Borlange at the top, and _ 
Uppsala in the middle. Imagine a single track connecting these three locations with a 
sidetrack located at Uppsala where a train can pull off and stop while another train 
passes. Time is represented on the horizontal axis. Trains are shown as lines on the 
diagram. The slope of the line indicates the speed at which the train would travel. Thus 
the path G on the figure can represent a train that starts early at Stockholm and moves 
slowly toward Borlange. Each point on the line G represents the location of the train 
(the vertical) at each point of time (the horizontal). The curve A is a train that would 
start later than G and travel faster reaching Borlange before G would arrive. Curve B is 
also a train that moves from south to north but the horizontal portion indicates that it 
pulls to the sidetrack and stops at Uppsala. Curve C is a train that would start in the 
north and move southward along the tracks. Nine different trains are shown in Figure 2. 
These are labeled A through H.
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The locations on this simple system of railroad tracks can be indexed as the set X. A 
single train can be interpreted as a function from time to a location on a system of tracks. 
In the notation to be used, a train is a function, r(t), where t is understood to be an 
element of a well defined set3, T, such as time of day, and r(t) is understood to be a 
point on a graph representing locations, X, on a system of railroad tracks. For example, 
the train A can be thought of as a function of rA(t):T �x. For each time of day rA (t) 
gives the location of the train, and the point (t, rA(t)) corresponds to a point on the path of 
train A in Figure 2. As multiple tracks can be considered to be a collection of single 
tracks, it would appear sufficient to consider th� scheduling problem for single tracks in 
isolation. 
From the figure a notion of feasibility of an allocation can be obtained. If both train A 
and train C operated, there would be a head-on collision at the location and time of 
intersection of the two lines. Similarly C and G would involve a collision as would· A 
and G. Because A is faster than G it would run into the rear of G at the time and location 
of the intersection. Some collisions can be avoided if a sidetrack exists. Thus, trains B 
and C do not collide because B pulls to the sidetrack at Uppsala and lets train C pass. 
Notice the line representing train B is horizontal, indicating that the train is not moving. 
The train waits for train C to pass before continuing on to Borlange. 
Trains and collisions are not the only consideration for feasibility. Track congestion can., 
be a problem, especially if equipment failures occur. Stopping distances require a safety 
margin between trains. Thus, feasibility can involve constraints that require that either 
train A or train B can operate but not both. These two trains would leave Stockholm so 
close together that safety regulations would be violated. 
A feasible schedule is a set of trains that involve no collisions and do not violate other 
side conditions, like safety regulations. Constructing the set of feasible schedules4, i.e., 
those with no collisions, is essentially the construction of a "production possibility set" 
for use of the track. As might be obvious from Figure 2, the set of feasible schedules 
and, thus, any production possibilities set, is neither smooth nor convex. In order to deal 
with such problems a somewhat different approach will be used which is based on a 
recognition that a binary conflict property plays a central role in the economics of the 
problem. Infeasibility of a schedule necessarily involves a conflict between two trains. 
If many trains collide, then two trains also collide and two is unacceptable. If many 
trains travel too close, then two travel too close and is unacceptable. Thus, any conflict 
implies that a pair is in conflict. 
Formally, a Binary Conflicts Environment, as applied to a rail allocation problem, is 
defined as a quadruplet ( X, I, F, C ). X is the system of tracks, the set of locations 
for trains. I is the set of individual agents that would like to have access to the tracks. F 
is the set of all trains that might operate on X, i.e., F={ r(t): T => X }, where T is a 
3 Obviously only certain functions can represent trains. Such technical restrictions on the mathematical 
representations are not imposed because they play no real role in the analysis that follows. The 
representation should only be considered as notation until otherwise stated.
4Which will be a set of sets. 
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relevant measure of time. In this notation F is infinite but in the analysis that will follow 
it will be assumed to be finite. C is a set of binary conflicts, a subset of 5 F ® F, which 
specifies pairs of trains that are incompatible. Incompatibility means that the two trains 
would collide if run or that if the two trains run, then some other safety standard would 
be violated. For example, if r1(t) = r2 (t) then the two trains 1 and2 would collide at 
location r at time t. If all trains are compatible, then C is the empty set. 
A feasible allocation, A* = (A , A1,, .. ., A1), is a set of trains, A, and a partition scheme, 
A; , that partitions A among the set of users I, such that: 
( i ) A; n A1 = 0 for i=;tj
( ii )  uiAi =A 
( iii ) A contains no conflicting pairs, i.e., A®A n C = 0. 
The nonconvexities inherent in binary conflict environments can create difficult 
computational problems. The use of the graph theoretic formulations facilitates the 
computation of solutions to some of them. It is easier to check for binary conflicts and 
reject an allocation if and only if one is detected, than it is to examine all possibilities for 
which binary conflicts do not occur. In this sense, the concept of a binary conflicts 
environment is important for the operational and computational feasibility required of 
processes. 
3. TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE DISCUSSIONS
Historically, scheduling has been seen primarily as a technical problem and not as a 
economic/political problem. Without the aid of computer technology,6 scheduling is an 
incredibly complicated task, and has concentrated on identifying a feasible schedule and 
then modifying it incrementally when changes are necessary. In Sweden, scheduling has 
typically consisted of ranking trains in priority and then resolving conflicts as they occur 
(requiring one train to wait or excluding trains) based on the priority ranking. Schedules 
are fine tuned by rules developed in administrative committees, and new services are 
added incrementally into previous schedules as possible. 
The system has been criticized for many reasons, many of which can be summarized as 
saying that access to track is not allocated to the users who value access the highest. The 
system is defended by those who claim that because of certain technical features nothing 
else will work. This section contains ten issues that have surfaced in the controversy. 
5 The notation ® represents a Cartesian product of two sets.
6 For a discussion of computerized rail scheduling techniques, see the review article of Petersen, Taylor,
and Martin (1986). Many models of rail operations seem to fix trains at their maximum possible speed 
while in motion. A notable exception is Kraay, Harker, and Chen (1989), who study how train speed
should be varied to meet an objective function based on travel time and fuel consumption, given the 
constraints that trains must stop for meets and passes to occur. In general, this literature assumes the 
viewpoint of a central dispatcher who wishes to maximize some function, and has some sort of 
administrative powers. The literature does not address issues of decentralized agents with conflicting 
objectives that are detennining the allocation through some competitive process. 
5 
The first six are issues raised by those who defend the current system of priorities against 
those who advocate decentralized and competitive access to the use of tracks. The final 
four are issues raised by those who criticize the system of priorities as being insensitive 
to efficiency improving possibilities. 
In discussing the issues the railroad system in Figure 2 will be used to· illustrate the 
points. In addition, the values in Table 1 will be used. Table 1 outlines values placed on 
trains by 10 potential users numbered as agent 0 through agent 9. Each agent has an 
additive preference for the nine trains labeled A through I. Two trains H and I involve 
no conflict and will be ignored throughout the discussions in this section. 
The issues listed here, and the example from Figure 2 and Table 1, are more than just an 
illustration. The system from Figure 2 will be the one that is used in actual experiments 
as a testbed for the mechanism that will be outlined in the next section. The preferences 
in Table 1 are taken from one of the patterns of preferences that will actually exist in the 
experimental testbed. The point of this section, and the next, is not only to explain the 
controversy, but to also show that the controversial elements are actually present in the 
testbed. 
The first six issues listed are those mentioned by critics of the decentralized proposals. 
They are aspects of the railway allocation problem that lead to skepticism that a 
decentralized or market based process can be applied successfully. The last four items on 
the list are issues that are raised by critics of the current system of priorities. These 
issues lead to skepticism about the system of priorities leading to an efficient alloc�tion. 
The discussions should make clear that all of the elements are in the testbed. 
Non-Track Constraints. How can safety considerations and other non-track constraints 
be guaranteed if decentralized competitive allocation takes place? Consider again Figure 
2 and assume that trains, such as the pair A and B, the pair C and D, and the pair E, and 
F are too close and, thus, cannot be operated together. If one runs then the other cannot 
run without violating a safety standard. If we let C be the set of binary conflicts 
implied by Figure 2, then these three pairs are in the set. (Note that if the set of binary 
conflicts is symmetric then the order is unimportant). Efficient allocation would require 
that no such pairs operate and that any process of insuring that non-track constraints be 
satisfied should not prohibit more than is necessary. 
Schedule Interdependency. The network in Figure 2 suggests the many complications 
that arise from schedule interdependencies. Suppose agent 1 operates early from 
Stockholm and from a choice of A or B wants to take A. Agent 2 operates from 
Borlange early and prefers C from a choice of C or D. However, 2 is persuaded by 1 to 
choose D which does not conflict with A. However, a choice of D has an impact on 
agent 3 who operates from Stockholm at a time later than 1, and who wants to choose E 
from the two options available E and F. If agent 2 runs train D then agent 3 cannot run 
train E because they are in conflict. 
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Revelation of Values. How can the private values of independent train operators become 
exposed and used in a competitive process? A type of "free rider problem" seems to 
exist. Consider an agent who would like to implement train G. This train is in conflict 
with all of the trains in the set { A,B,C,D,E,F }. If G is to operate it must somehow 
preclude all of these, or if any of these trains operate then train G must be precluded. If 
the set of rights to operate { A,B,C,D,E,F } are held by different operators, then they 
must either be paid, thereby creating a "holdout problem" for the operator of G who must 
strike a price with each individually, or if the operator of G has the right to operate, then 
these different operators must collectively pay the G operator, thereby creating a type of 
public goods problem among themselves. In both cases the independent operators could 
have an incentive to misrepresent their true values of.operations. 
Resource and Market Fragmentation. If a classical market process is to be used, then the 
number of potential markets would be large. How would markets be defined? It is 
possible to divide the tracks into mile by time squares and have a market for each. 
Given the system represented by Figure 2, a natural division would have the track 
divided into three segments (Stockholm- Uppsala , sidetrack at Uppsala, Uppsala -
Borlange) and time divided into four segments morning, midday, evening, and night. 
This would create twelve markets. For the example, this number of markets might not be 
so onerous but for more complex tracks this is going to require a large number of 
markets, possibly raising transactions costs to both operators and the seller. 
Strong Complements. If the "multiple independent market" approach mentioned in the 
paragraph above is used, then strong complements will be present, and since there exists 
an inherent discreteness in the commodities, the efficient outcome may not be 
supportable by competitive equilibrium prices. Suppose only routes G, A, and E from 
Figure 2 are of value and that the commodity space is as defined by using time of day. 
For example, assume that the whole track is sold, and as defined by two times of day, 
morning and midday, which is enough time for train G to travel from Stockholm to 
Borlange. This gives only two commodities. Assume that there are only two agents j 
and k, and that agent k is willing to pay a total of $ 1 0  for both morning and midday track 
access in order to operate G, but otherwise places no value on the tracks. Agent j would 
pay either $7 for the morning in order to run train A, or would pay $7 for the midday in 
order to run train E, but does not want to run both trains. Trains A and E just require 
part of a day for the trip but, by assumption, the market is not sufficiently profitable for j 
to operate both trains. The optimal allocation is for agent k to own both the morning and 
the midday track access and for agent j to have neither. Yet, competitive prices for both 
morning and midday must be above $7 to exclude agent j, but, if the price of both is $7 
or above, agent k does not wish to buy. The optimum cannot be supported as a 
competitive equilibrium. 
Competitive E<J,uilibrium Existence. It is clear from the examples that track allocations 
involve discrete goods regardless of how the commodities might be defined and the 
number of markets that might be involved. The possibility that competitive equilibria 
might not exist in the absence of convexities is well established and is demonstrated by 
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the example above. Thus, in the case of rail allocation there is no reason to suppose that 
competitive equilibria necessarily exist. 
Priority and Substitution Between Users or User T}l'!es. Suppose any agent is given 
priority, as is the case with the current system. If G was the most valuable route to any 
user with priority, then it would be implemented. For example, if agent 0 was given the 
right of priority for a single train such as G, then, as can be ascertained from Table 1, 
train G would operate at a value of 1604. But there are many options that have greater 
value than G. In particular, B, C, and E held by agents 1, 0, and 7, respec�vely, have a 
combined value of 3022. Given such a priority system, there is no incentive for the three 
trains run by different users to be substituted. 
Priority and Combinin& Trains. Suppose that fast trains have priority over slow trains 
and that agent 0 is operating fast trains but had no priority for a slower train such as G. 
As can be seen from the Table 1, the value for G to agent 0 is 1604, while the value of 
the best feasible fast trains to this agent is the set of three trains B, C, and E that total to 
1134. The agent has no incentive to combine trains if the result is a slower train because 
priority, and thus the trains, would be lost. 
Priority Gives no Incentive to Wait. If agent 7 has priority with north to south fast 
trains, then the agent has no incentive to delay and wait. Given the preferences of Table 
1, agent 7 would operate train A even though another agent, such as agent 0, must delay 
and run train D rather than train C. Agent 0 values train C by a difference of 3 37 over D, 
while agent 7 values A, which forces agent 0 to delay to train B, in which agent 7 waits, 
by only a margin of 102. Thus, an allocation in which Agent 7 waits, as opposed to 
Agent 0, would increase total value by 335. With priorities there is no incentive for this 
to take place. 
Priority Systems Do Not Respond to Chan&in& Circumstances. If the track authority 
always assigns priorities correctly, then an efficient allocation is often possible and 
depends on the ability of the priority rule system to span all feasible schedules. 
However, to assign priorities correctly, the track authority must gather the necessary 
information from independent operators, or operating divisions, in order to make these 
decisions. It may not always be in the interests of the operators to truthfully reveal this 
information. Furthermore, as circumstances change, the information must be gathered 
again and again. Apparently, the criticism that "access to track is not allocated to the 
users who value it the most" directly attacks the ability of the track authority to gather 
this information using the current administrative processes. 
4. THE TESTBED ENVIRONMENT AND ASSUMPTIONS
A testbed environment is in a sense a challenge to a mechanism. The philosophy is to 
include features in the environment that are thought might cause some difficulty but, at 
the same time, keep the environment sufficiently simple such that, should difficulties be 
encountered, the causes might be isolated. The elements of the testbed as dictated by the 
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railroad allocation controversy are the physical features (rails and conflicts) and the 
preferences of agents who want to use the system. The essence of the physical features 
of the testbed are substantially as outlined in the previous two sections. Agent 
preferences were induced with monetary incentives. · 
Experimental Procedures 
A total of three experimental sessions were conducted. Subjects were Caltech students 
recruited through an announcement on the campus computer network. Procedures in 
each o·f the three experiments are essentially identical. Each of the three sessions lasted 
approximately 2-21/2 hours and required ten subjects. Each session consisted of seven 
periods. 
· 
Each subject received common instructions included in Appendix I, as well as an 
individual incentive table and common supplies (e.g. scratch paper, pocket calculator). 
Because of space, the individual incentive information tables were not included in 
Appendix I, but instead are summarized as matrices in Appendix II. Each table consisted 
of 20 pages. Each page consisted of an individual firm's incentives for the routes 
(projects) for one period. Only the first 7 pages were actually used.· 
No mention is made of trains or scheduling in the experimental instructions. The 
language of the experiment is "project" for train route, and "combination of projects" for 
train schedule. Language was chosen to make the experiment independent from the 
specific industrial application, in an attempt to eliminate any effects of preconceived 
notions subjects may have about railroad operations. 
Rail Resources 
The set X is the set of tracks represented in Figure 2. 
The set F of trains will be the set of nine elements { A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H,I } . Of course 
this is a small set relative to the number of potential trains that can be imagined. Two 
factors were considered. The first is whether or not all of the important economic 
complexities are present. The second was the limitations imposed by existing 
experimental laboratory technology on the communication of incentives to subjects in an 
experiment and the capacity of the technology to deal with communication over large 
sets. It was decided to tackle the questions of scale only after it was established that the 
mechanism could operate on a small scale. In reality, the scale is not so small since these 
nine options constitute a very large number of potential sets of operating trains and since 
the information about the values of these options is not known to a central authority. 
The set C, of binary conflicts is represented in graphical form in Figure 3. Recall that C 
is a binary relation such that each pair in C represent a conflict of some sort or a 
collision. For example, the line connecting A and B reflect the fact that because of non 
technical considerations, e.g. safety, trains A and B cannot both operate. From the graph 
.it can be seen that the same is true for pair C and D and for pair E and F. The graph has 
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a line connecting G with each of the letters { A,B,C,D,E,F } representing the fact that G 
cannot operate without collision with any of these other trains. A comparison of the 
graph in Figure 3 with the system in Figure 2 will demonstrate that the physical and 
safety restrictions are fully represented. 
A�nts and Preferences 
The set I of agents is { 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 ,8,9 } . ( In some of the analysis the index is from 
1 to ·10 and agent 0 is re-labeled as agent 10 so t�e reader should not become confused. 
The change in convention was necessitated by some of the software). 
Agent preferences for trains in the set F were induced with monetary incentives that were 
additive and separable. The value that agent i has for route f is V[f]. Thus, an agent's 
payment was a sum of independent payments for each train route purchased. For the 
issues outlined in the above section more complex preferences are unnecessary. All of 
the issues raised in that section are present. 
Given the nine trains A-H of the testbed rail environment, and 10 agents, specification of 
additive separable incentives7 involves picking a value for each route and firm, resulting 
in a matrix of 9x10 values such as Table 1. The testbed environment consisted of a series 
of periods. Each period a different set of preferences existed. Values in the incentive 
matrices were randomly drawn from a distribution that was constrained to satisfy several 
conditions as outlined in Appendix II. The primary purpose of these constraints is to 
create the routes B,D, and F as inferior substitutes (i.e. delayed version, where delay is 
always costly) of routes A,C, and E, respectively; to eliminate the possibility of 
monopoly; and spread out possible allocations over a range of efficiencies. The high 
value for G is never high enough to make G optimal, thereby creating the potential 
problems of revelation discussed in the previous section. 
Variation of the incentive matrices from period to period provides an opportunity to test 
the responsiveness of the Binary Conflict Ascending Price (BICAP) mechanism to 
changes in the marketplace. One criticism of the priority scheme currently used in 
Sweden is its lack of such responsiv�ness. Variations in the incentive matrices will result 
in different optimal allocations, and one can determine if the mechanism outcome 
follows these changes. 
5. THE BINARY CONFLICT ASCENDING PRICE (BICAP) MECHANISM
A mechanism involves three essential elements: a set of feasible outcome allocations, a 
message space through which agents interact with each other and with the allocation 
7 Clearly more complex preferences of a non additive type could have been used. None of the arguments 
introduced above depended critically on such preferences so they were not used. Modifications of the 
mechanism may be needed to deal with certain types of non separable preferences over trains. The 
preference could also be modified to allow externalities among operators but again such complications 
are left for future studies. 
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authority, and an outcome rule which specifies how these messages determine a unique 
outcome from the feasible set of allocations. In the Binary Conflict Ascending Price 
mechanism each agent submits bids for trains in a continuous time auction. The highest 
bid on a train prevails as the potential winner and cancels all lower bids for the train. At 
every point in time the potential allocation is defined by the set of bids that has no 
conflict and has the maximum sum of all feasible allocations - those that have no 
conflicts. The process of bidding continues until some pre specified time has elapsed 
with no bids taking place. Formally the mechanism as defined by the rules that 
characterize the process is outlined by the following statements. 
A feasible allocation A* is as defined in section 2 as a I+ 1 tuple (A, A1 , . . .  , A, ), 
consisting of the set of trains, A c F , that will be actually operating and the assignment, 
Ai, of the rights to operate those trains to the individual operators. Technically the 
elements of A* satisfy 
( i ) AJI Ai = 0 for i:t:j
( ii )  uiAj =A 
( iii ) A contains no conflicting pairs, i.e. A®A n C = 0. 
A feasible set .,/ ( X, I, F, C )  is the set of all A*. In the case of the railroad allocation 
problem the feasible allocations are defined relative to the set ( X ,  I, F, C) of section 2 
and as applied to the testbed environment as defined in the preceding section. 
The message svace for each individual is the set of pairs, (b,f), where b is a bid in terms 
of money for the train route f. 8 Where needed, (b,f); is the message sent by agent I. For 
all applications that follow it will be assumed that the message space is finite and, in 
particular, the values that bids can take are finite, thereby implicitly inducing a property 
of a minimum possible bid increment. 
Payoff relative minimum bid increments are equal to the minimum units in which payoffs 
can be measured. That is, if the minimum unit in which payoffs can be measured is one 
cent, then the minimum bid increment is one cent. 
Definitions: 
B(f) = the highest bid price for each f E F, measured at some particular stage of the 
mechanism. That is B(f) =max, (b,f), for a given stage of the process. 
B = the set (vector) of all highest bid prices, 
H(f) = for each f, H(f) E I = the i that holds the high bid for f, i.e. (b,f); = (B,f). 
i°*[B] =a potential allocation = an allocation that will actually be carried out if the 
auction ends given bids the vector of bids B. 
8The message space could be generalized to include sets of trains or even ordered sets of trains. A set 
would be interpreted as a request that all bids be accepted or none be accepted. Such generalizations will 
not be pursued in this paper. 
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Throughout the auction, (X,I,F,C), B, H, and '*[B] are all common knowledge. 
Bid Submission and Termination Rules The auction proceeds as follows: 
a. At the beginning of the auction, B(f) is set to 0 for all f.
b. An agent (say i) may send a bid message (b,f);, stating a willingness to
pay b for the train f. If b > B(f), then B(f) is set to b and H(f) is set to i, and '*[B] is 
recomputed. Otherwise, the bid is rejected and B(f), H(f) and '*[B] remain unchanged. 
c. If no bid message is made for some time period T, then the auction
ends, the allocation '*[B] is implemented, and agents with high bids who receive 
allocations must pay their bids. 
Determination of t°*[B] is by the following "track value" optimization problem: '*[B] 
corresponds to a feasible allocation which maximizes the sum of stated willingness to 
pay B(f), where the sum is taken over the f that are allocated in A*. That is, 
'*[B] =[A, A1, A1,..,AI] E ,I: maximizes LfeA B( f ) . In the event of a tie the 
status quo is always chosen. 
In summary, the mechanism works as a set of simultaneous ascending auctions. Each 
auction is for a different train, f, and so there could be as many auctions as there are 
possible trains. A bid is submitted in real time and with each bid the mechanism 
determines if the new bid is higher than the old bid for the train on which the new bid 
was submitted. Only the highest bids are kept as information by the mechanism. After 
the high bid changes on any train the mechanism then determines the set of trains that 
maximize the total value of the track sale given the existing bids. This set of bids is 
announced by the mechanism as the potential allocation, which would actually be carried 
out if there are no more bids during some pre specified period of time. 
Any mechanism must have operational features. The mechanism must be implemented 
in a form that works when used by human agents. ·Each subject/agent was stationed at a 
personal computer that was attached to other agents through a token ring network. 
Figure 4 is a representation of the screen as seen by a subject. On the actual screen, 
different project lines were in different colors to aid in reading the table. The status 
column indicates the potential allocation. If a bidder had a high bid for one or more 
projects, those bids were tagged on the screen, as is project "C" in Figure 4. Bids are 
entered by pressing the key corresponding to the project, and then entering a value. The 
bid value and project may be edited, or the bid may be deleted. A special key (Fl) must 
be pressed to actually send the bid into the mechanism, at which point it is checked 
against the high bid. If the new bid beats the high bid, it is sent to the other screens and 
becomes binding (if accepted in the final allocation) until replaced by a higher bid. 
When entering bids into the experimental software, subjects had difficulty with 
typographical errors. It was easy for subjects to create typographical errors by 
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forgetting to hit a key which deleted previous input. This tended to cause false large bids 
to be entered into the system, such that a subject would lose $10-$50 if forced to honor 
the bid. When such an error occurred, the experimenter reset the experimental software. 
The subjects were instructed that the period would start over and that they should 
continue using the same incentive value sheet. The possibility exists that subjects created 
false typographical errors to delay the mechanism, but there are no obvious profit 
opportunities from using such a delay strategy since incentives are the same when the 
period is restarted. For the purpose of analysis, only the error free run of each period is 
considered valid data. 
The Binary Conflict Ascending Price (BICAP) mechanism is actually somewhat similar 
to the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks, Ledyard and Porter 
(1982) but with some important differences. Appendix III addresses these differences 
and contains a sketch of related literature. 
6. BEHAVIORAL THEORIES, ASSUMPTIONS, AND PERFORMANCE
In this section, some behavioral models of the BICAP mechanism will be reviewed. 
Performance of the system will be evaluated primarily in terms of its capacity to produce 
an efficient allocation. The behavioral modeling will be used as a check for design 
consistency. The question is whether or not the mechanism is operating according to the 
principles that were the underpinning of the design. Since there is no fully worked out 
theory about the behavior of such complex mechanisms, especially when operating in 
complex environments, an approach less ambitious than a general and rigorously tested 
behavioral theory must be used. The questions that the models will help answer are, 
''Does it work and does it work for the right reasons?" If it works, but for the wrong 
reasons, then one would be very cautious about whether or not it might work in more 
complex environments, or even in environments in which it had not been tested. 
The primary evaluative tool will be the efficiency of the final allocation. The system will 
operate at 100% efficiency if the sum of the private values of operators in the final 
allocation is the maximum possible over the feasible possibilities. This measure is 
motivated by the classical consumer surplus arguments and related cost-benefit analysis. 
Notice that under the conditions of the environment this is not a simple task. The values 
of agents are known only to themselves and they are never asked to communicate these 
values to anyone. Thus, the process must behave as if it knew the values and as if it 
could solve the related constrained maximization problem, even though the values are 
never communicated as such. 
The modeling effort developed in the following paragraphs departs somewhat from the 
modern view that behavior is captured by a fully developed theory of games and, instead, 
is based on the concept of "stationary points" that were used in the early development of 
mechanism theory. Parts of game theoretic principles are retained, but the heart of the 
behavioral models will rest on the limited actions that are available to an agent at any 
stage of the mechanism. In essence, an individual's options are to choose to bid and the 
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amount, or to choose not to bid. The behavior hypothesis is that such choices are 
conditioned on the state of the system, the last choices, including the choices of others 
and himself/herself, and the value of the trains. 
Classify bids (b* ,f*)i which agent i might make according to their effect on agent i's 
potential profits - that is, the profit agent i would make if the auction ended after the bid 
(b*,f*)i. 
pivotal bid = a bid that increases agent i's potential profit should the mecJ:tanism ... 
terminate immediately after the bid is submitted. That is the bid is below i's train value 
and high enough to change the potential allocation of the mechanism. 
strong neutral bid = a bid that leaves agent i's potential profit (and allocation) the same, 
and the bid is low enough for its future acceptance to possibly improve future potential 
profit, i.e. b* <Vi [f]. That is, the bid is below i's train value but not enough to change 
the set or potential allocations. 
dominated neutral bid = a bid that leaves agent i's potential profit (and allocation) 
remains the same, but b* > VJf]. 
dominated bid = a bid that would reduce profit for agent i should the mechanism 
terminate immediately after the bid is submitted. 
null bid = a bid that is below the high bid for a train route and is thus equivalent to a bid 
of zero. 
The definition of an equilibrium, or a stationary point to be introduced next, has some of 
the features of the classical Nash equilibrium but it falls far short of incorporating the 
full range of strategic possibilities and considerations. The behavior model will have 
individuals looking only one period ahead in which only a limited set of strategies are 
available. That is, the agents strategies are functions only of the current state of the 
mechanism. That is, consider only strategies that depend on the environment ( X, I ,  F ,
C ), the highest bid vector B, and the agent's allocation A.[B] in /P* ( B )  and train 
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redemption values V.[f] that result from the allocation of the trains. Principles of game 
theory have the level' of information on which strategies could be conditioned to be
much larger, and would include the complete history of previous moves as well as beliefs 
about the train value vectors of other agents. Nevertheless, the analysis presented below 
will be confined to the limited set of strategies for purposes of definitions and modeling. 
In order to emphasize the fact that the behavioral models have the special feature of 
agents that look only one period ahead, the equilibrium is called a Nash-1 stationary 
equilibrium. 
Definition. A Nash-1 Stationary Equilibrium (NEl) for the BICAP mechanism is a 
feasible allocation A* and a set of highest bids B, indexed by f, supporting this 
allocation that have the Nash property that no pivotal bids exist for any agent. 
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The idea of a stationary point is much different from the idea of an equilibrium point in a 
game because the property of stationarity at a point is completely divorced from the 
dynamics or logic that might have brought the system to the point. As a consequence, it 
is clear that in the testbed environment NEl stationary points exist and it is also clear that 
the pattern of bidding that allocates the trains to those that value them the most can be 
supported as a NEl. Consider the allocation and bids resulting from every agent bidding 
his/her value V[f] for each train f. Such behavior might not be sensible, but if it happens 
then the system is "stuck" at a NEl, because no agent can make a profit increasing bid 
given his/her previous bids and the bids of others. The first price rule and the fact tl)at 
bids must be increasing assure the stationarity property. Perhaps a more interesting 
example in the additive, separable individual values environment, is the case in which the 
agent with the second highest value has bid his/her value and the individual with the 
highest value is bidding only the minimum necessary increment above the bid of the 
second highest value. This is again an efficient allocation and no individual has an 
incentive to bid. The system is at a stationary point. 
An additional equilibrium concept will be useful. It is based on the concept of a strong 
Nash equilibrium of a game in which no coalition has available a strategy from the 
coordination of the strategies of its members that makes all members better off. Of 
course, in the context of the discussion here the concept is related to stationary points. 
Definition. A Strong Nash-I Stationary Equilibrium (strong NEl) is a NEl in which no 
collection of agents can tender a set of bids that improve the profits of all members of the 
collection should the mechanism terminate immediately after the bids are tendered. 
The literature on mechanism design contains the suggestion of a dynamic behavioral 
process that will cause the process to terminate at an NEl.9 The proposed behavioral 
principle is that agents follow a type of "gradient method" of exercising choice, which 
involves keeping the mechanism going if they detect the existence of pivotal bids. This 
does not mean that they necessarily choose to make a pivotal bid as they would according 
to Nash/Cournot models of behavior, but the individual does not allow the process to 
stop. If individual choices are characterized by such a principle then the final resting 
place of BI CAP will be a NEl as defined ·above. The principle is not necessarily th_at 
agents choose an optimum over the "short term" strategies that present themselves, but 
does choose to keep the process going if profitable opportunities exist. The following 
paragraphs will make the ideas clear. 
Definition A dynamic process is called a discrete pivotal process if 
(i) Agents never submit dominated bids. 
(ii) Train redemption values are finite for all agents. 
(iii) There is a minimum bid increment, finite, non-zero, and payoff relative. 
9 The process is the B process invented and studied by Hurwich, Radner and Reiter. While the B process 
is developed as part of an exchange process and is, therefore, different in many ways from a behavioral 
hypothesis developed in the context of BICAP, the basic behavioral structures are very similar. See 
L. Hurwich. R. Radner and S. Reiter, (1975a, 1975b). 
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(iv) No agent allows the auction to end whenever he or she has the ability to make a 
pivotal bid. 
Remark 1. If agents decision behavior in the BICAP mechanism is a pivotal process, 
then the outcome will be NEl and furthermore, any NEl can be supported as the 
terminal point of some pivotal process. 
In order to understand the reasoning that supports the remark, notice that under 
assumptions (i)-(iii) the auction must eventually_stop. Then, when the auction does stop, 
condition (iv) implies that the outcome is NEl. Conditions (ii) and (iii) of the discrete 
pivotal process guarantee that for k, trains with redemption values bounded by v, there 
can be, at most, kv bids while satisfying condition (i). Only non-null bids allow the 
auction to continue. Therefore, the auction will stop at some set of bids. When the 
auction ends, (iv) implies the absence of pivotal bids for all agents. Clearly (iv) implies 
NEl. Suppose the auction has arrived at an NEl and consider the pivotal process in 
which individuals take only actions that are pivotal. Under these conditions the 
mechanism will terminate. 
From the above remark we know that a pivotal process will converge to a NE 1 and we 
know that the efficient allocation can be supported by a NEl if the process happens to 
converge to it. But, many NEl may exist so simple convergence to an allocation 
supported by an NEl is not necessarily satisfactory performance. The following 
definitions provide concepts that can help better characterize principles of behavior that 
will lead to efficient outcomes. 
The idea is to extend the model beyond the intuition provided by the Nash response 
assumption, which has individuals only taking actions that result in a direct benefit. The 
behavioral principle to be added to the model asserts that individuals will not let the 
process stop as long as they can make bids that have a potential for improvement, 
depending upon the actions taken by others. The role of this new principle is similar to 
the role played by "out of equilibrium" play in the literature on refinement concepts in 
games. Of course, in the mechanism model, agents are not assumed to have a complete 
analysis of all contingent actions. The following principle will make the idea precise. 
The Exhaustive Offer Hypothesis. No individual will allow the mechanism to terminate 
as long as he or she has the ability to make a strong neutral bid. 
Definition. A dynamic process is called a discrete strong neutral bid process if 
(i) Agents never submit dominated bids. 
(ii) Train redemption values are finite for all agents. 
(iii) There is a minimum bid increment, finite, non-zero, and payoff relative. 
(iv) Individual bidding behavior is consistent with the Exhaustive Offer Hypothesis. 
A strong neutral process is a pivotal process since pivotal bids are strong neutral. Clearly, 
a strong neutral process will converge to the efficient allocation. Rather than allowing the 
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market to close when an agent cannot make a pivotal bid, the agent will behave 
according to the Exhaustive Offer Hypothesis and submit a strong neutral bid, if one 
exists, precommitting himself to a higher level of potential payment on some unallocated 
train. In part, this could be negotiation or signaling, but the neutral bids also form the 
basis of a game of chicken in precommitments. As the clock ticks down, agents must 
decide whether they are willing to increase their bid by the minimum bid amount in order 
to continue the auction, or if they wish to risk relying on some other agent to do this. In 
this way, the "local" game will encourage some revelation of redemption values on all 
unallocated routes. The revelation of values then guides the process to the efficient 
allocation under the condition of separability that is present in the testbed. 
7. RESULTS
The experiments confirm, that , in fact, a decentralized mechanism can solve some of the 
technical aspects of the rail scheduling problem and yield efficient allocations. Not only 
are the results efficient, but design consistency appears strong. Outcomes correspond to 
one-stage Nash-1 stationary equilbria. Evidence exists that the process of convergence is 
essentially as captured by the pivotal process introduced in the previous section. In 
addition, inefficient NEl seem to be avoided because of a high degree of revelation in 
the bid prices. These results tend to refute the argument that efficient decentralized rail 
allocation is impossible as a matter of principle. 
Table 2 summarizes the experimental parameters and results, simultaneously. Only the 
highest and 2nd highest incentive values are thought to be important for determining 
prices, allocation, and strategic behavior. There are 7 different periods (parameter sets) 
which were repeated in identical sequence in 3 different experiments. 
The table is read as follows. The first row contains for the first period (of all three 
experiments) the high redemption value for each of the nine individual routes, the 
identification number of the agent that held the high value, and the optimum system 
schedule which is the maximum valued feasible schedule. Reading across the row, the 
optirrial schedule is { A,D,F,H,I } ;  and the maximum redemption value for route A is 1699 
held by participant number 3, etc.,. Row 2 contains the second highest redemption 
values. Row 3 shows that the actual schedule that resulted in period 1 of experiment 1 
( { A,D,F,H,I } - which was optimal), and it shows, for example, that the maximum bid for 
route A was 1300 tendered by participant 3. Rows 4 and 5 show the period 1 data for 
experiments 2 and 3 respectively. Row 6 starts the enumeration of the same data for 
period 2. The table continues through period 7. 
The first result suggests that the mechanism is successful in producing efficient 
allocations for the rail allocation problem. Efficiencies are calculated from the table, as 
the ratio of the total of redemption values for agents at the outcome allocation divided by 
the maximum possible total value of redemption values. The maximum possible total is 
attained at the optimal allocation. As was discussed in the previous section, this is a 
standard measure. 
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RESULT 1. The outcomes produced by the mechanism are near 100% efficient. 
SUPPORT. The table directly supports three statements concerning efficiency. (i) 
Inefficient outcomes are rare. In 18 out of 21 experimental trials, the mechanism resulted 
in the optimal allocation. Only 3 of the 21 trials, only period 2-experiment 3, period 3-
experiment 2, and period 5-experiment 3 resulted in allocations that were not optimal. 
Thus, for trains A-G the efficiency is 100% in 86% of the experimental trials. (ii) For 
the 3 inefficient trials in periods 2, 3, and 5, efficiency for trains A through G is at 
0.82,0.65, and 0.93 respectively. This yields an average efficiency of 97% for trains A-G 
for the experiment. (iii) Trains H and I are always allocated in the optimal manner.• 
Given that the mechanism is efficient, the question of design consistency is now 
addressed. It is not sufficient that the outcomes are efficient, but rather they should be 
efficient for theoretically understandable reasons. This increases the guarantee that the 
mechanism will behave similarly in other environments which are untested but 
theoretically similar. 
To begin this examination, Table 3 represents a measure of " distance " of outcomes 
from NE 1 outcomes in terms of the potential profitability of pivotal responses. The 
entries in the table are the maximum potentially profitable pivotal response available to 
any agent. In a sense the entries are the maximum opportunity cost of stopping 
(assuming that the process would go only one step more). For each agent, a search was 
made for the most potentially profitable pivotal bid at the final bid prices for each period. 
A maximum was then taken over all the agents for that period, and the amount of this 
potentially foregone profit, along with the agent i.d. number with the corresponding 
pivotal bid opportunity were tabulated and entered in Table 3. Entries of zero 
correspond to NEl outcomes, since a zero entry is only possible if there are no remaining 
pivotal bidding opportunities at the close of each trial. Positive entries represent 
possibilities for profit, and are stated in Francs. (Francs conversion rates varied, worth 
$0.005-$0.02, or so). 
Typically, in experiments there is an unknown variable subjective cost for .getting agents 
to take any action. That is, if only $0. l 0 is to be made by pressing the keys, it is possible 
that the agent will not take any action. Taking these costs into consideration suggests a 
classification of outcomes from Table 3 into strict NEl and "thick indifference" NEl 
type outcomes. Consideration of both as degrees of NEl behavior yields Result 2. 
RESULT 2. Outcomes tend to be NE I .
SUPPORT. Consider the entries in Table 4 that are a classification of the outcomes 
taken from Table 3. A little over one third of the periods result in strict NEl .  
Approximately 71 % have deviations less than 50Fr ($0.25-$0.50). This leaves only 29% 
of the periods resulting in outcomes that were not NE I or "near" NEl in the sense that 
the maximum opportunity cost of a move was low.• 
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The property is strengthened by the fact that the outcomes that are near NEl tend to be 
strong NEl. Given the bids expressed in the mechanism at the final outcome, no 
coalition of more than one individual could construct a joint bid unavailable to members 
acting alone, that would produce benefits for some members of the coalition and hurt 
none of the others. 
RESULT 3. Outcomes tend to be strong NEl. 
SUPPORT. All strong NEl outcomes are outcomes that are coalition-proof in the sense 
that a coalition of members has no profitable opportunities available to it at the final 
prices and allocations that the individual members could not carry out unilaterally. This 
result was obtained by brute force, i.e., a computer algorithm was used to do an 
exhaustive search over all coalitions for profit opportunities, given the final prices and 
allocations in each trial. No additional opportunities for profitable bids, outside those 
available to individual agents, were found.• 
An efficient outcome does not require NEl behavior, just as NEl behavior does not 
guarantee efficiency due to the existence of multiple equilibria. However, if the 
conjectures behind the design of the mechanism presented in the preceding section are 
correct, one would expect there to be a correlation between NEl and efficiency. An 
examination of the inefficient outcomes yields the following result: 
RESULT 4. Inefficient NEI do not occur. 
SUPPORT. In the environments studied, inefficient outcomes coincide with failure to 
converge to a NEl. Period 2-experiment 3, period 3-experiment 2, and period 5-
experiment 3 resulted in inefficient outcomes. In Table 3, these three trials account for 
the three largest deviations from a NE 1 outcome.• 
COROLLARY. If outcomes are inefficient then they are not NEl. 
The Corollary above, together with Result 2, present natural questions. Why does the 
process result in NE ! outcomes and why among those does it seek only the efficient 
outcome? Is this a lucky accident or is it related to the game theoretic structure of the 
problem? The answer is suggested by the Nash equilibrium convergence property of the 
discrete pivotal process stated as Remark 2 in Section 6. The next result indicates that is 
the case. 
In order to facilitate the result, Table 5 was compiled. Every non-null individual bid 
was recorded by a computer during the experiments. Classification of these bids into the 
pivotal, neutral, and dominated categories is done and recorded in the table. 
RESULT 5. Convergence to NEI is governed by the discrete pivotal process. 
SUPPORT. If the process is operative then convergence will be to a NE 1 by virtue of 
Remark 2.  Only two assumptions of the process involve behavior. One of the 
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assumptions, listed as (iv), is that individuals will choose in accord with the Exhaustive 
Offer Hypothesis and then will not let the process stop if pivotal bids exist. The 
tendency for this property to be satisfied is established by Result 2. The second property 
is that individuals not tender dominated bids. The data in Table 5 reveal that dominated 
bids account for 0-6% of the biddjng activity. Thus, the tendency of bidding behavior is 
to tender non dominated bids as required by the process. With the tendency for both of 
the properties of the process to be satisfied one can conclude that it is operative and thus 
characterizes equilibration.• 
The fact that the assumptions for the class of discrete pivotal processes seem to be 
satisfied suggests searching the bidding data to see if the type of behavioral dynamics in 
operation can be isolated more precisely. Result 6 shows that the strong neutral bid 
processes are good candidates. The case is made by eliminating from consideration those 
dynamics, like "local" or "one stage" Nash/Cournot reaction functions, that suggest that 
no choice will be made unless it changes the state in a favorable way. Strong neutral bids 
are those (non dominated bids) that place the bidder as the high bidder for a train that is 
not part of the potential allocation even after the bid is tendered. Thus, it does not 
change the state and thus is not explained by the dynamics of one stage Nash/Cournot 
reactions. The concept of strong neutral bids adds behavior that is absent from the more 
game theoretic principles of behavior. The data from Table 5 will be used to show that 
strong neutral bids are frequently made. The data from Table 6 will be used to show that 
the dynamics exhibit no tendency to stop at a NEl the first time such a state is reached. 
RESULT 6. From among many possible discrete pivotal dynamic processes, the class of 
strong neutral processes receives support as an explanation of the convergence path. 
SUPPORT. First, strong neutral bids exist as a substantial feature of bidding behavior. 
On average, strong neutral bids consist of approximately one third of all bidding 
behavior. Note from the Table 5 that in some periods there are more strong neutral bids 
than pivotal bids, and in others, vice versa. Thus, even though with the same period 
parameters, different experiments can have substantially different ratios of pivotal bids to 
neutral bids, a tendency exists for a substantial portion of bids to be strong neutral. 
Second, a tendency exists for the dynamics to not stop at NEl when they are attained. 
Thus, the dynamics tend to not be the discrete pivotal processes that limit behavior to 
NEl reaction functions. Table 6 examines the frequency with which bids place the 
mechanism at an NEl intermediate outcome. No attempt is made to distinguish between 
NE 1 outcomes which support the same allocation but which are slightly different in bid 
price and those which produce different allocations. According to Table 6, either the 
mechanism never reaches an NE l outcome, or it passes through multiple NEl outcomes. 
From Tables 3 and 6 , only in two of the twenty-one cases, namely period 3-experiment 
3, and period 6-experiment 2 does the mechanism stop at the first NEl outcome reached. 
Since, the class of discrete pivotal processes where strong neutral bids are not used must 
stop at the first NEl outcome encountered, those dynamic processes can be discarded 
from consideration. Thus, the presence of multiple NEl intermediate outcomes and the 
use of strong neutral bids at intermediate NE 1 outcomes suggests a refinement like the 
strong neutral process.• 
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The fact of efficiency when taken with Results 5 and 6 creates an interesting picture of 
the dynamics. The mechanism wanders over the allocations until the optimal set of trains 
is "discovered". The bidding then proceeds to advance until ari allocation of the set of 
trains and a set of bids is attained that supports the optimal as a NE l .  The process of the 
"discovery" of the optimum must be associated with a process of preference revelation 
and coordination. We have no rigorous theory about how this might take place but the 
intuition rests on the submission of strong neutral bids which reveal the social 
opportunity cost of the allocation. The basic intuition is that individual bidding behavior 
is consistent with the Exhaustive Offer Hypothesis. Strong neutral bids will be made as a 
type of "negotiation" process driven by the possibility that the auction will terminate 
unless a bid is made. By making bids on unallocated trains an agent is contributing to the 
"public good" of defeating the current allocation. The strong neutral bid process holds 
that a person will reveal rather than let the market close. When the possibility for strong 
neutral bids is exhausted, then all excluded agents have revealed the maximum any 
would ever be willing to pay for the excluded trains. Since the potential allocation is of 
higher value than any allocation possible from the excluded trains, the final allocation 
must necessarily be efficient if the excluded agents are fully revealing their willingness to 
pay. 
If the NEl property of the dynamics of the discrete pivotal process guarantees that the 
high value bidder has the final standing bid for allocated trains; and, if the high value 
bidder has the final standing bid for excluded trains, then whatever trains are allocated 
will be allocated to those who value them the most. The only question is how the proper 
set of trains might be chosen. If, in addition, the excluded agents bid as high as their 
redemption value, then the operation of the BICAP mechanism assures that the proper 
allocation will be chosen and that an efficient allocation will be the final result. Thus, 
several measurements of value revelation are suggested by this logic. For excluded trains, 
does the high value bidder have the final standing bid? How high is this bid, either in 
terms of a percentage of the agent's redemption value or as a distance from it? 
A complication in the parameters makes a clean analysis difficult. Often an agent will 
have high redemption values on a pair of ·trains which are in conflict. In this case,_it may 
not be to that agent's advantage to have the high bid for both trains, since he would, in 
effect, be bidding against himself. An opportunity cost exists for the agent that lowers 
the agent's value on the excluded train by the amount of potential profit on the allocated 
train for which he has the standing high bid and which would be foregone if the 
allocation switched to the other train. Thus, the data can be divided into the "clean 
cases" for posing the questions and the "unclean cases." The conjecture that follows 
summarizes the weight of our assessments. 
CONJECTURE. Social opportunity costs of allocation are revealed through the 
operation of the BI CAP mechanism. 
SUPPORT. The clean cases are selected pairs in selected periods in which the 
. conflicts happened to not exist. Different agents have the high value for trains A and B 
2 1  
in period 7, for trains C and D in period 4, trains E and F (also) in period 4, and for train 
G in periods { 1 ,2,3,5,6 } .  In all other periods the same agent will have high values for a 
pair of conflicting trains. In period 7, train B is excluded from the allocation, and in 
period 4 trains D and F are excluded while G is excluded in all periods. Aggregation 
over the periods and trains above provides 24 excluded train· "clean cases" for analysis of 
the conjecture. In these cases the high value individual tends to hold the high bid and also 
reveal the value to the mechanism. The results are: (i) The high value agent has the 
high closing bid in 18/24 or 75% of the 24 excluded train cases; (ii) On average the 
excluded agent bid 93.8% of the high redemption value for the 24 excluded train cases. 10 
Thus, the social opportunity cost is revealed in these cases. 
The "unclean cases" are more difficult. Revelation behavior is different when the holder 
of the high redemption value for one train that is included in the potential allocation also 
holds the high redemption value on another train that is excluded from the potential· 
allocation. If all unclean cases are aggregated (all cases in which the high value agent 
has the high value for a pair of conflicting items), the high value agent has the final bid 
on the excluded item in the pair a total of 33 out of 60 cases. Thus, in 27 of 60 unclean 
cases the high bidders on the excluded items are not the agent with the highest 
redemption value. In this sense, the social opportunity cost information is not reveled to 
the mechanism. However, the revelation is as one might expect from a design 
consistency point of view. The second high value agent has the final bid on the excluded 
item in an additional 18 out of 60 cases. Bid revelation by one of the top two value 
agents then yields a total of 5 1  out of 60 cases. This suggests that while agents may not 
bid as high as the highest redemption value on excluded routes, the second highest 
redemption value holder is being revealed. 
The natural question now is whether the redemption values are being revealed. For this a 
measure is developed. 
For each train, set 
d2 (f) =max ( 0 , 2nd highest redemption value for f - B(f) ) 
If the final bid is above the 2nd highest redemption value, then d2 (f)=O. d2 is thus a 
measure of the amount by which the bid is less than the second highest redemption value. 
Table 7 compares bid prices with redemption values, in such a way as to pool data 
across all periods. On average, when optimal allocations occur, revelation of values is 
near the second highest redemption value. This occurs to within an average of 1 OFr on 
allocated routes and 28Fr on unallocated routes. Depending upon the individual this 
amounts to something on the order of a nickel to a quarter on an item that is worth 
several dollars.• 
1 °The overbid by agent 10 in period 4, experiment 2, train D was counted as a bid for the full amount of 
the redemption value, 594, and not the amount of 920 which was bid. Using the amount of 920 would 
have raised this figure still further. 
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The pattern of results provide much evidence of design consistency. The reasons for the 
efficient allocations are for theoretically understandable reasons. Agents do not limit 
their behavior to reaction functions that only make themselves better off. They take 
actions that make no changes in their own well-being but depending upon the actions 
taken by others might make themselves better off. This dynamic leads away from 
inefficient allocations that otherwise might exist as equilibria. The nature of BICAP is 
such that it pits competitors against each other such that values become revealed to the 
mechanism and then it uses that information to move the system in a dynamic in the 
direction of optimal allocations. The analysis also suggests that the nature of potential 
inefficiencies might be related to agents with "conflicts" and the resulting "market 
power." Having a degree of "power" they might not bid against themselves and as a 
result prevent some degree of information revelation. This lack of efficient operations is 
clearly a parameter issue and not an issue related to the principles upon which the 
mechanism design rests. Nevertheless, it is important to note that while from the point 
of view of design consistency this issue surfaces, it was not generally a problem in the 
operations of the mechanism since the mechanism operated at near 100% efficiency. 
9. CONCLUSIONS
This paper began with questions motivated by the proposal to privatize the railroads in 
Sweden. Critics of the proposal have claimed that as a matter of principle a decentralized 
decision process cannot be used as an allocation tool. Advocates of the program have 
claimed that certain problems created by a system of priorities that exist in the current 
allocation process could be solved by a decentralized process. The question posed was 
whether or not it is possible to create a process that will successfully allocate resources 
under conditions that critics say will render the task impossible, which at the same time 
will avoid problems that would exist if a system of priorities was in place? 
The answer is that is it is possible. Such processes exist. A testbed environment, which 
was developed in the paper, contained many of the elements that decentralization critics 
· claim will prevent the operation of a decentralized allocation or market process. In this 
environment the Binary Conflict Ascending Price (BICAP) mechanism operated at near 
· 100% efficiency. Furthermore, analysis of the behavior of the mechanism reveals that 
the reasons for the efficient operations was not simply a fluke or an accident of choice of 
experimental procedures. The details of behavior were substantially in conformance with 
behavioral models of the process. Thus, proof of concept has been established in the 
sense that the process is observed operating efficiently. Furthermore, a principle of 
design consistency has been satisfied as well since the outcomes are occurring for the 
right reasons. 
Clearly the issues raised by the deregulation effort in Sweden do not end with this paper. 
More complex environments must be pursued and the BICAP might become modified in 
order to accommodate the problems that they present. Firstly, there are issues of scale. 
The restriction of trains to only a set of nine avoided problems that may surface with 
presentation of data to participating agents. The reduced scale also avoided confrontation 
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with certain computational problems. While these two problems must be solved, the 
experiments here suggest that the problems are only technical. If speed of computation 
can be attained and if the screen displays are manageable then under the additively 
separable preferences and a sufficiently competitive network, the BICAP mechanism 
should work efficiently at a large scale. 1 1  Nothing in the testbed environment suggested 
that strategic or coordination or any other economic consideration, would be a source of 
problems. 
More complex environments must be studied now and might be more important than 
scale considerations. · There are problems that might surface with different types of 
preferences. Preferences in the testbed were additively separable. More complex 
preferences involving non additive sets might make the pivotal process less applicable 
and thus take the research into areas in which the behavior might not be so clearly 
understood as it was in this first testbed. In addition to the problem of non additivity, a 
possibility exists that network externalities between specific operators might be present. 
The passenger load of one train might depend heavily on the particular operator of a 
different train. Or, even more complex would be cases in which the preferences of 
operators for other trains in the network might depend on the particular operator of the 
trains. The theoretical literature contains suggestion about how BICAP mechanism 
might be modified to deal with such problems but the research is yet to be done. 
This study as provided a first step along a possibly long road of necessary research. A 
decentralized mechanism can be designed to facilitate the efficient access to a complex 
network like a railroad. Such processes cannot simply be dismissed as impractical. The 
BICAP mechanism introduced here and the testbed environments are an open invitation 
to theorists that might want to try their hand at improved designs. 
1 1  Depending upon the pattern of train conflicts. computing time could rise exponentially in the number 
of trains. This is because the optimization problem is NP-complete. If this effect exhausts computing 
resources, then some changes to the optimization portion of the mechanism would probably be required. 
24 
APPENDIX I EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS. BICAP. 7n/93. 
1 ST7 TESTBED 
Introduction 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The 
instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you 
might earn money which will be paid to you in cash. 
In this experiment, we are going to conduct a computerized market over a 
sequence of trading periods. The items to be sold are called projects, and are designated 
by letters of the alphabet (project A, project B,  project C, etc . . .  ). You may try to purchase 
any number of projects as you wish. The value to you of any particular project is detailed 
on an attached set of redemption value sheets. Notice that these sheets are labeled 
period. I ,  period.2, etc . . . Notice that the redemption values vary from period to period. 
During the experiment, pay careful attention to make sure you are using the correct sheet 
in evaluating which project(s) you wish to purchase. [note: the information on the 
redemption sheets is your own private information. do not reveal it to anyone.] At the end 
of each period, project(s) you have purchased are redeemed by the experimenter for the 
amounts indicated on these sheets. 
Your profits in a period, then are determined by the difference in the redemption 
amount you receive for the projects you purchased and the amount you paid for them. 
1.e. your profit = (total project redemption value) - (total purchase price)
Each project can be sold to one and only one buyer during each period. The 
projects are sold via an auction, carried out using the computer terminals. You will have 
an opprotunity to bid on each project as many times as you wish. To bid, follow the 
instructions at the bottor:n of the screen. Bids are not binding until the SEND key is hit. 
Bids which are lower than the current bid on the screen are ignored. Once your bid for a 
project is sent into the system , and becomes the current bid, you are obligated to honor it  
until someone else bids higher on the same project, at  which point it  is  deleted from the 
system. 
There is an additional complication. Not all combinations of projects are possible. 
For example, it could be that if X is sold, that Y or Z cannot be sold. Incompatible groups 
of projects are detailed on an attached sheeL The computer will use the bidding 
information to determine which group of projects to sell to maximize the amount of 
money collected from buyers. The set of high bids which would actually be accepted by 
the computer at any particular time is displayed on the computer screen and updated along 
with any new bids. 
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At the end of each period, the computer notifies each buyer of any successful bids. 
Unsuccessful bids are not displayed. At this time, buyers should fill out their BUYER 
RECORD SHEET and calculate any profits (or losses) from the period. 
Currency: 
The currency used in these markets is "francs." At the end of the experiment 
francs will be 
converted to dollars at the rate of: francs equals· one dollar. [the 
exchange rate is also private infonnation. do not reveal it to other participants. ] 
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None of the following pairs are feasible, nor is any combination containing one or more 























H: nothing conflicts with H. H is allways feasible. 
I: nothing conflicts with I. I is allways feasible. 
Examples: 
{ A,D,F} is feasible since neither A,D , A,F or D,F are listed above. 
{B,D,F } is not feasible since B,D is listed above as being impossible. 
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ID NUMBER: LIST TOTAL TOTAL PROFIT OR 
PROJECTS PURCHASE REDEMPTION LOSS(-) 
PERIOD# PURCHASED PRICE VALUE 
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Appendix n: Experimental Dara 
The data sets for this cxpcrimcnt, if printed out, would easily exceed 50 pages. Only summuy information is prcscnrcd hc:rc. yet this infann•tion should be sufficient far 
most analysis. A·full dam set on diskcue is available by n:quest. 
The information is broken down as follows: 
Il.A : Parameu:r summary 
lI .B: Fmal allocation and prices by period
Second by second bidding information is available from the authors on diskcnc, 
but is not presented he�. 
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Rule lnrcmrctation 
A>B; C>O; E:>F for eYCJ)' f um. Fums aJways can make mare money n.tzuua1 A.C 
ar E than B.D. or F. Oelayiai tbe nm imposes 
an additional con. 
max(G) < maxCB+C+E.A+D+f) • wilb I.be mu G is never optimal. However. G is often !ugh 
c:ompuu:d over all rums (i.e. this is only one enough 10 be an obs1&cle lO firms aying 10 obtain
rcmic:tion. not a n:slriction for each firm - one of tbe others (n:c::.all that G contlic:ts w1tb all 
indeed it may be violalcd for particular farms but of A tbroush f). This presents the possibiliry tbal 
not in the whole) a c:oordiD&lion problem may cause G co Win when 
it is not optimal. 
noce: the first two rules force the optimal 
aUocalion t0 be either A+D+F+H+L 
B+C+E+H+L or A+E+H+L 
B+C+F+H+I is never cnximal. 
A finn may have lhe maximum value (among all 1bis is lO prevent �Jy. We are only 
finns) for up lO one pair of I A.B ) , I c.D) or intcrc:Su:d in mi.dying competitive behavior. 
fE.F.l 
Th� .is al least a separation of 500 From an efficiency viewpoint. there is no reason
berwcen A+D+F and :s+c+E. to be c:oncc:med if GA USM yields only a slightly 
sub optimal aJloc:ation. We wish to =st GAUSM 
in an cnviromm:Dt where efficiency is 
substantiallv diffemu over different allocations. 
Firms having a maximum value Camong all firms) This is to spread earnings our over subjccu. so 
for H or 1 may not have a maximum v&Juc for A that none is so unlucky as lO leave the experiment 
through F. with zero earnings. Recall that routes H and I are 
· always aJIOC&led. because they do not conflict 
with anvthinsi. 
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Train Redemption Values Vj[f] for each period. 
These same redemption value tables were used in all the experiments. 
'od 1 nen1 
a2ent id# A B c D E F G 
0 332 232 878 708 746 426 2619 
1 946 521 321 241 739 265 2491 
2 302 198 307 270 1013 645 1329 
3 1699 645 307 206 306 217 509 
4 1282 454 1634 1447 341 134 2543 
5 801 354 933 465 936 561 2339 
6 389 242 387 1 1 7  583 348 423 
7 320 132 1405 974 528 360 594 
8 708 332 309 188 1635 1421 2005 
9 372 277 341 138 395 284 1549 
'od 2 oen 
a2ent id# A B c D E F G 
0 368 133 683 346 320 108 1604 
1 1 124 980 3 19 269 340 291 93 
2 303 2 1 9  335 168 1 359 641 373 
3 305 1 7 1  371 149 524 177 466 
4 403 325 463 237 475 382 124 
5 692 487 320 267 1027 515 1625 
6 405 3 1 5 370 194 375 284 570 
7 413 3 1 1 417 343 430 377 531 
8 558 340 354 270 577 224 304 
9 362 1 54 320 96 3 12 206 1710 
'od 3 oen 
a2ent id# A B c D E F G 
0 425 365 360 1 1 6 500 310 598 
1 319 24 1 337 263 463 194 1843 
2 528 382 350 1 1 7  306 206 1570 
3 1858 6 1 5  840 662 384 264 412 
4 456 376 1 227 964 3 15 105 206 . 
5 660 405 342 2 1 7  328 169 1336 
6 413 227 3 1 4 248 368 257 382 
7 448 290 37 1 274 943 774 1 387 
8 312 267 1 025 657 482 341 247 
9 300 1 09  45 1 244 309 257 1731 
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"od 4 nen 
a1?ent id# A B c D E F G 
0 1020 410 788 594 356 187 48 
1 883 553 1 193 381 537 3 10 392 
2 516 334 768 385 309 106 1533 
3 362 147 446 151 455 249 1401 
4 496 348 303 128 1300 430 918 
5 334 258 3 12 228 300 174 1386 
6 516 222 386 139 1067 812 ' 2057 
7 366 157 309 245 652 290 607 
8 319 158 597 499 306 247 1 135 
9 1371 1105 615 439 410 277 130 
"od 5 oen 
a1?ent id# A B c D E F G 
0 680 501 347 121 318 283 1589 
1 645 302 302 121 340 299 606 
2 341 189 699 518  363 153 1636 
3 365 151  599 193 873 557 1039 
4 650 246 505 255 576 300 1395 
5 2108 700 384 263 321 175 1616 
6 436 349 726 235 580 356 1999 
7 568 438 1 162 873 369 246 34 
8 301 103 465 194 570 281 1295 
9 648 527 760 634 315 267 1470 
. d 6 neno 
a1?ent id# A B c D E F G 
0 438 342 353 176 1005 603 5 14 
1 565 398 419 151 405 141 1 14 
2 788 459 675 334 5 14. 360 67 
3 300 219 462 179 389 305 214 
4 305 1 1 1  67 1 327 342 218 143 
5 374 294 669 272 785 471 864 
6 527 360 385 218 500 245 1340 
7 309 174 347 124 690 243 956 
8 408 340 325 23 1 342 227 645 
9 353 210 1341 749 645 397 724 
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'od 7 nen 
a2ent id# A B c D E F G 
0 1444 581 308 174 452 270 401 
1 480 288 337 224 838 . 554 54 
2 1685 550 648 292 509 418 41 
3 635 558 301 127 473 283 710 
4 305 220 1071 931 486 266 1260 
5 971 394 538 256 335 218 698 
6 740 614 415 319 519 301 25 
7 835 447 315 127 361 229 331 
8 540 341 307 144 5 17 211 174 
9 325 198 316 107 557 169 1 133 
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ILB: High bids· by period.
Format 
.. 960. 120. 12. 
lime d-limc p::riod bidsA B c D E F G 
lime - time in sec. since beginning of program (only differences me signif&C&IU) 
d-time - bow long period 1aszd. in seconds. 
H I 1 
period - period # in cxpc:rimcnL wbcneYer a mbjea IDlde a  l)'JIOgiaphical enor, it was l'C'"1'n11y ro reset 
the pc::riad. see lhe conversion &able with ach file ID tee wbicb periods me free of l)'POS and 
which periods go with which dm seu. 
bidsA - amount of high bid. followCd by bidder ID number of high bidder. . 
Note: ID·10" here =  ID·o· in panmcu:r seu. 
Note: · The data hen: includes summaries for periods in which the subject made
. typographical errors. A table is included which maps experimental periods to parameter
sets. 
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time d- period 
time 
133 96 1 
1009 224 2 
1 398 92 3 
2338 923 4 
3203 727 s 
3379 42 6 
3944 554 7 
4 340 330 8 
4564 198 9 
4675 46 10 
4830 lSO 1 1  
4960 120 12 
5624 659 13 
5774 76 14 
5957 1 73 15 
6234 272 16 
b4 1 9 67 17 
68 1 0  387 18 
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E F G H I J 
300- ().() SOO- 0-0 ().() ().() 
.. 3 ·  
.t05- 210.. 1600- 400- 600- 213-
1 10 -10 9 10 6 
200- 0-0 S606 200- 100- ().() 
1 - 1  9 10 
731- 800- U.01 890- 12SO 0-0 
1 8 -10 s -S 
1030 514- 1610 32G- 240- 100-
-2 .5 -9 s 6 1 
10-1 0-0 0-0 225- 150- ().() 
2 6 
500- 341- 1840 700- 790- ().() 
7 7 -1 2 8 
967- 430- 14SO SO(). 400- 0-0 
6 4 -6 3 2 
1050 500- J4SO 400- 400- ().() 
-A 6 -6 3 2 
300- ().() 500- 200- 2855 ().() 
3 4 2 -7 
500- 2222 900- 250- 420- 0-0 
3 -7 4 2 6 
400- 1060 1400 350- 575- 0-0 
3 -8 -6 2 4 
850- 360- 1589 550- 800- 0-0 
3 3 - ID 4 4 
500- 120- 800- 1 50- 210- 0-0 
5 l 6 3 g 
6306 305- 1 340 156- 222- 0-0 
-7 3 -6 3 I 
79 1 - 400- 1340 353- 450- 0-0 
1 0  5 -6 I 6 
1 0 1 - 1 ()().. 0-0 1 00- 21'27 0-0 
8 l I -6 
730- 4 10- 7 1 0- 165- 396- 0-0 
I I I J O  1 0  
Dara for 7/10/93 - 7pm 
bpcrimcnw Period Parameter Set Period 
1,.2.3 eqwpmcnt.u:mn1. subjc:a practice







lime d· pc:riad bids 
lime A 
109 .5 I ()...0 
499 29 2 ()...0 
1� 25,S 3 .sooo... 
3 
21.s.4 1 1 1 4 900-"4 
2314 133 .5 1 120-
4 
24'49 128 6 950-3 
2875 412 7 1 300-
3 
3 158 166 8 750... l 
3378 207 9 1000-
I 
3847 448 10 1000-
I 
3988 65 1 1  1002-
3 
4743 750 12 675-3 
4886 .52 13 100-
10 
5007 1 1 3 14 3203-
6 
.5499 I '485 IS 901 -J O  
5795 
1
2 1 9 1 6  400- 1  
5852 
1















38 1 ·5 
20...8 
1 0 1 -B 
600-9 
I �002 . 
I 0-0 
c D E 
()...0 ()...0 0.0 
()...0 ().() 0.0 
3350- 1000- .SOl-6 
I 4 
100-7 100-3 UJQO .. 
II 
85()...7 500-7 JOO(). 
8 
100-7 JOOS. 1 100-
4 8 
1300- 974-4 1 1 12· 
7 II 
340-8 270...7 360-3 
3503- 330- 70:5.5 
4 JO 
66()... JJ()... 1000... 
JO JO 2 
0-0 100-7 0-0 
1025· 656-8 60()...7 
4 
()...0 ()...0 ().0 
300- 1 1 0 1 -1 370-4 
730-1 920- 1299· 
1 0  4 
634-7 1 20-8 400-3 
I o.o 0-0 O·O 
5 964 
1
1 07 1 8  
1
4 20-7 1 1 89- 2  1 6 1 2 ·7 1 37 -7 
1
363-2 
6604 I 634 1 1 9  
7262 1 595 
1
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1
340 I 21 
I � I O I · I 527-9 1 800-7 1 634-7 1 750-3 
I 100. 2  I 409-2 I 700-9 I 334·2 I ��-
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2 
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8 
1502· 1 00- 3  47()...6 600-4 0-0 
I 
360-3 1 999- 55.5-4 800-4 ()...0 
6 
360·2 1 300- 35.5- 1 '400- 6  ().0 
6 
400·2 400-4 1 20-4 1 25 - 1  0-0 
370- 1 700-3 22 1 · 391 - ()...0 
J O  1 0  
1>11a fr. 1n0193 - 10pm
E.xpc:rimemal Period 
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I 10 
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2 9 
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C00.7 0.0 12.00- 5004 llSQ.. CM> 
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4 6 
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6 
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7 
1206- 200-2 1cm. 13S.I 320-I 0.0 
.JO 6 
650- 50-9 ().() 3 1 0. 1  310-I 0.0 
J O  
0.0 ().() ().() 0.0 0.0 0.0 
I 
7� �5 1cm. JSl· I 4Q0.6 0.0 
1 0  6 
JCXJl. 0.0 7 10.9 J .,5 0.0 0.0 
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APPENDIX III 
In recent years, several different computer assisted markets or other computer assisted 
allocation mechanisms have been developed, possibly as a response to both a perceived 
increased demand for decentralized allocation of complicated systems and an increasing 
supply of networked computing equipment necessary to carry out complex bargaining 
procedures involving many agents. The Table in this appendix summarizes these efforts. 
Many of the mechanisms listed in the table could be suitably modified for rail allocation. 
Rather than compare and contrast the results from each study, the purpose of this 
appendix will be to compare the B ICAP mechanism developed here with the AUSM 
m'echan ism of Banks, et.al. [ 1982]. To begin, a short review of the AUSM mechanism is 
presented. Then, the similarities and differences between the two will be explained. 
The AUSM mechanism was developed in response to space station resource planning 
problems. On the space station there are N goods in finite supply, and agents require 
definite packages of these goods. Often the goods are strong complements and not 
substi tu tes, e.g. an astronaut needs oxygen, heat, water and volume, ·and without the 
required amounts of each of these goods cannot be safely placed on the station. The 
q uestion posed was how to allocate goods packaged to agents' specifications in such a 
way as to maximize efficiency. 
Banks, et.al. message space allows bids to take the form ( d , V ) where d is a demand
vector specifying (possibly zero) demands of each of the N goods and V is a willingness 
to pay for this vector of resources in terms of a numeraire good. At each stage of the 
mec hanism ,  there is a potential allocation consisting of a set of bids which would be 
accepted if no more bidding were to take place. 
When a new bid is entered, it is compared with the potential allocation. If there is 
sufficient unallocated supply for the new bid to be satisfied, the new bid is included in 
the potential allocation. If there is not sufficient unallocated supply, the new bid is 
compared with the bids in the potential allocation, and those bids which maximize 
allocation value are retained as the new potential allocation. This means that either the 
new bid is accep ted, and older, less valuable bids are discarded, or the new bid is 
discarded . 
There are two different versions of AUSM .  depending on what is done with the d iscarded 
bids. In AUSM with QUEUE, discarded bids are sen t to a bulletin board w here agents 
coordinate and possibly recom bine and resubmit their bids . Without the q ueue, no such 
coordination between agents is allowed. 
In comparison to B ICAP, these mechanisms sound very similar. Both are i terative, and 
report back to agents potential allocations which would talce place should no more bids 
be subm itted . In both cases, the potential allocations correspond to the bid revenue 




Mechanism Environment Iteration Acceptable B id Rejection I Allocation Payment 
Rule Bids Removal Rule Rule 
B inary Conflict 1 Seller iterate bid must higher bid on objects 1 st price 
Ascending Many until soft improve upon same object allocated to 
Price (BICAP)• Buyers close previous bid removes old bid. maximize sum 
for that object of closing bids 
Adaptive User 1 Seller iterate bid must h igher bid on objects 1 st price 
Selection Many until soft improve value same object allocated to 
Mechanism Buyers close of the removes old bid. maximize sum 




Sealed B id 1 Seller one-shot bids with does not apply objects d ual pricing. 
Combinatorial Many sealed bids packaging allocated to price = value 
Auctionc B u yers .  constraints maximize sum of additional 
of closing bids unit. 
Iterated I Seller. iterate bids with no cancellation objects 2nd price, 
Vickrey- Many until soft packaging possible (?) allocated to from Vickrey 
Grovesd B uyers. close constraints maximize sum /Groves 
of closing bids fonnula. 
1 First defined in this paper.
b Jeffrey S. Banks, John 0. Ledyard, and David P. Porter, "Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: an experimental approach," Rand Journal of 
Economics. Vol. 20. No. I , Spring 1989 
c S.J. Rassenti, V.L. Smith, and R.L. B u lfin, "A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time S lot AUocation" Bell Journal of Economics. Autumn 
1 982. 
d Banks, et.al. 1989. 
_p­o 
Mechanism Environment I teration Acceptable B id Rejection I Allocation Payment 
Rule B ids Removal Rule Rule 
Rail One SeJJer, iterate train routes prices adjust to demands market 
Tantonnemente Many until soft demanded at reflect excess granted when clearing 
Buyers. close. announced demand or supply process price for 
prices for and bidding starts equilibrates each track 
track over with old bids segment 
eliminated 
Gas Auction Many i terative suppliers does not apply objects market 
Net' Sellers. until soft /demanders allocated to clearing 
Many close send in limit maximize price for 
Buyers. order curves. reported each market 
surplus 
Pipeline Many i terate quantity prices adjusts to demands market 
Tatonnemenlg Sellers.  un ti l  soft demanded at reflect excess granted when clearing 
Many close. announced demand or supply process price for 
B uyers. price. and bidding starts equilibrates each market 
over with old bids 
eliminated 
Cassini Many continuous offers to trade bid cancellation chains of l st price 
Resource Sellers. resources possible trades 
Exchangeh Many executed upon 
B uyers. reauest 
e P. Harker, S .  Hong . " Pricing of Track Time in Railroad Operations: An Internal Market Approach". Working Paper, Fishman-Davidson Center for the 
S tudy of the Service Sector, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. 1 992 
r S tephen J. Rassenti, Stanley S. Reynolds, and Vernon L. Smith, "Cotenancy and competition in an experimental auction market for natural gas pipeline
networks." Economic Theory, Jan. 1 994. 
g Charles R. Pion, "Research on Pricing in a Gas Transportation Network" Office of Economic Policy Technical Report No. 88-2. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission. Washington, DC. July, 1 988. 
h John Ledyard, David Porter and A. Rangel ( 1994) forthcoming
However, because AUSM discards bids which are not part of the current allocation and 
because BICAP does not, the mechanisms are not the same. In the BICAP bids once 
tendered are commitments until they are replaced by a better bid. This is true in BICAP 
whether or not the train is part of the potential allocation. However, in AUSM if a bid is 
not part of the currently accepted set it can be removed or canceled. Thus the strategic 
features of the two mechanisms differ. 
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T bl 1 0 a e : nerator V I  fi T . . E a ues or rains m an x e>enmen t.al R ' I E . 81 nvironment 
a�ent # A B c D E F G H I 
0 368 133 683 346 320 108 1604 127 127 
l 1 124 980 3 1 9  269 340 29 1 93 127 127 
2 303 2 1 9  335 168 1 359 64 1  373 1 27 1 27 
3 305 171  371 149 524 1 77 466 I O  2 
4 403 325 463 237 475 382 1 24 68 1 73 
5 692 487 320 267 1027 5 1 5  1625 430 7 
6 405 3 1 5  370 194 375 284 570 0 1259 . 
7· 4 13 3 1 1  4 1 7  343 430 377 5 3 1  222 1 03 
8 558 340 354 270 577 224 304 24 28 
9 362 1 54 320 96 3 1 2  206 1 7 10 3 1 9  1 68 
4 2  
Table 2: Summary of Experimenial Parameters and Results. 
high A B c D E F G H l 
period feasible 
nacka�e 
1 - high redemption values ADFHI 1 699 645- 1634 1447 1635 1421 2619  1432 1 3 1 8  
-3 3 -4 -4 -8 -8 - 1 0  -5 -5 
1 - 2nd highest redemption values BCEHI 1 282 521 - 1405 974- 1 0 1 3  645- 2543 888- 123 1  
-4 1 -7 7 -2 2 -4 9 - IO 
I - daia from experiment 1 ADFHI 1 300 601- 1401 1295 73 1 - 800- 2601 890- 1250 
-3 l -4 -4 1 8 -'10 5 -5 
1 - ':daia from experiment 2 ADFHI 1300 520- 1 300 974- 1 1 12 900- 2600 888- 1250 
-3 I -7 4 -8 8 - 1 0  5 -5 
I - data from experiment 3 ADFHI 1500 520- 1000 1000 l lOO 1000 2615  900- 1250 
-3 1 -4 -4 -8 -8 - IO . 5 -5 
2 - high redemption values BCEHI 1 124 980- 683- 346- 1 359 64 1 - 1 7 10 430- 259-
- 1  l 1 0  I O  -2 2 -9 5 6 
2- 2nd highest redemption values BCEHI 692- 487- 463- 343-- 1027 5 15- 1 625 3 19- 1 73-
5 5 4 7 -5 5 -5 9 4 
2 - data from experiment 1 BCEHI 1090 486- 6 1 0- 340- 1 030 5 14- 1 610 320- 240-
-1 1 1 0  7 -2 5 -9 5 6 
2 - data from experiment 2 BCEHI 1000 500- 660- 3�0- 1 000 505- 1660 320- 190-
- 1  I 1 0  1 0  -2 5 -9 5 6 
2 - data from experiment 3 AEI-ll 1 100 400- 682- 345- 1059 300- 1 610 333- 200-
- 1  5 10  10  -2 4 -9 5 6 
3 - high redemption values ADFHI 1 858 6 1 5- 1 227 964- 943- 774- 1 843 886- 849-
-3 3 -4 4 7 7 - 1  2 8 
3 - 2nd highest redemption values BCEHI 660- 405- 1025 662- . 500- 34 1 - 1 73 1  757- 759-
5 5 -8 3 1 0  8 -9 6 5 
3 - data from experiment 1 ADFHl 1050 600- 1 100 8 1  I - 500- 34 1 - 1 840 700- 790-
-3 3 -4 4 7 7 - 1  2 8 
3 - data from experiment 2 BCEHI 675- 38 1 - 1 025 656- 600- 400- 1 830 786- 790-
3 5 -4 8 7 7 - 1  2 8 
3 - data from experiment 3 ADFHl 1000 364- 1050 675- 550- 350- 1560 786- 770-
-3  1 0  -4 4 7 7 -2 2 8 
pcnod high A B c D E F G H I 
feasible 
oacka2e 
4 - high redempuon values BCEHI 1 37 1 1 1 05 1 1 93 594- 1 300 8 1 2- 2057 1 1 23 1 258 
-9 -9 - 1 1 0  -4 6 -6 -3 -2 
4 - 2nd h1ghes1 redempuon values BCEHI 1 020 553- 788- 499- 1 067 430- 1 533 254- 368-
· I  0 I 1 0  8 -6 4 -2 8 5 
4 · data from expenment I BCEHI 1 000 726- 790- 594- 1 050 500- 1 450 400- 400-
- 1 0 9 I 1 0  -4 6 -6 3 2 
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4 - dat.a from experiment 2 BCEHI 901 - 600- 730- 920- 1 299 805· 2040 300- 458-
10 9 I 10 -4 6 -6 3 2 
4 - dat.a from experiment 3 BCEHI 1 150 550- 800- 500- 1 100 255· 1 900 260- 458-
-9 9 I JO -4 9 -6 3 2 
5 - high redemption values ADFHI 2 1 08 700- 1 162 873- 873-. 557- 1 999 755. 1 102 
-5 5 -7 7 3 3 -6 4 -4 
5 - 2nd highest redemption values BCEHI 680- 527- 760- 634- 580- 356- 1 636 554- 758-
10 9 9 9 6 6 -2 6 9 
5 - dat.a from experiment 1 ADFHI 1 320 525- 932- 654- 850- 360- 1 589 550- 800-
-5 9 7 7 3 3 - 1 0  4 4 
5 - dat.a from experiment 2 ADFHI 1 10 1  527- 800- 634- 750- 360- 1999 555. 800-
-5 9 7 7 3 3 -6 4 4 
5 - dat.a from experiment 3 ADFHI 1 500 520- 1 135 520- 700- 360- · 1995 575- 760-
-5 9 -7 9 3 3 -6 4 4 
6 • high redemption values BCEHI 788- 459- 1 34 1  749- 1 005 603- 1 340 358- 676-
2 2 -9 9 - 1 0  1 0  -6 1 6 
6 - 2nd highest redemption values BCEHI 565- 398- 675- 3 34- 785- 471 - 956- 353- 394. 
I I 2 2 5 5 7 6 1 
6 • dat.a from experiment I BCEHI 701 - 425- 676- 3 10- 79 1 - 400- 1 340 353- 450-
5 2 9 4 1 0  5 -6 1 6 
6 • dat.a from experiment 2 BCEHI 700- 409- 700- 334- 800- 360- 1 300 355- 400-
2 2 9 2 1 0  2 -6 1 6 
6 - dat.a from experiment 3 BCEHI 700- 400- 750- 400- 780- 400- 1000 353- 400-
2 2 9 9 1 0  5 -6 1 6 
7 - high redemption values ADFHI 1 685 6 1 4- 107 1  931 - 838- 554- 1260 1483 1465 
-2 6 -4 4 1 1 -4 - 1 0  - 1 0  
7 • 2nd highest redemption values ADFHI 1 444 58 1 - . 648- 3 19- 557- 4 18- 1 1 33 164- 392-
- 1 0  10  2 6 9 2 -9 8 3 
7 · dat.a from experiment 1 ADFHI 1450 560- 6 1 0- 350- 730- 4 10- 7 1 0- 165- 396-
-2 l 1 4 l l 1 1 0  1 0  
7 - dat.a from expenment 2 ADFHl 1 485 55 1 - 600- 400- 570- 370- 700- 22 1 - 39 1 -
-2 10 4 4 l 1 3 10  10  
7 - dat.a from expenment 3 ADFHI 1485 5 10- 648- 450- 625- 420- 1 1 33 1 70- 400-
-2  10 2 4 1 1 -9 I O  1 0  
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T bl 3 M a e . . 11 fi bl · 1  bl ost potenua lV pro 1ta e, ava1 a e p1vota l b'ds 1 d f at en o period. 
period experiment 1 experiment 2 experiment 3 
possible who possible profit who possible profit who 
profit 
1 0 0 0 
2 0 26 5 538 I 
3 56 6 9 13  3 0 
4 16  6 57 0 10 6 
s ·  30 6 105 7 352 7 
6 0 0 4 5 
7 7 5 47 5 0 
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Table 4: Classification of final allocations as Nash e uilibria. 
uilibrium Classification #cases 
soict Nash uil d=O 8 





Table 5 :  Classification of individual bids. 
period experiment bid event 
counts 
dominated neutral oivotal 
I 1 6 1 2 1  83 
2 2 20 60 
3 I 28 45 
2 I 1 2  1 0 1  9 1  
2 l 44 63 
3 0 42 90 
3 I 4 104 1 1 1  
2 3 8 1  142 
3 0 1 9  73 
4 I 2 1 2  25 
2 4 54 74 
3 I 27 62 
5 I 3 46 93 
2 3 66 93 
3 2 36 70 
6 l 4 1 5  74 
2 6 34 1 29 
3 0 2 1  66 
7 I I 44 94 
2 6 37 75 
3 l 1 7  24 
totals 62 969 1 637 
4 7  
T bl 6 NEI a e . outcomes d . unng eac h " d  per10 . 




strict (d=O) within 50Fr 
1 1 17 17 
2 2 9 
3 8 9 
2 1 6 19  
2 0 4 
3 0 0 
3 1 0 0 
2 0 0 
3 I 3 
4 1 0 1 0  
2 0 0 
3 0 2 
5 1 0 1 3  
2 0 0 
3 0 0 
6 1 4 10 
2 1 7 
3 0 4 
7 1 0 4 
2 0 1 
3 4 8 
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T bl 7 C a e . ompanson o f b"d I pnces an d h 2 d h" h t e n •J? est route red emption values. 
Optimal AllOC&led ltria1.t d.,(A) d.,(B) d.,(C) d.,(D) d.,(E) d.,(P) d.,(0) d.,(H) d.,(I) 
Schedule Schedule 
ADFHI ADFHI 1 1  IV2 0 15.8 44.6 10.4• 25.6• 0.7• 97.6 5.6 0.1 
max 0 7 1  4-0S 1 14• 282• 8• 433 57 1 
BCEIIl BCEIIl 8 IV2 17.4 0.5 7.3• s.o 6.1 54.9 12.3 0 0 
max 1 19 3 58• 24 27 175 83 0 0 
BCEHI AEIIl 1 --- 0 87 0 0 0 215 15 0 0 
(pcr#2· 
cxo#3) 
ADFHI BCEHI 1 --- 0 24 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 
(pcr#3-
cxo#2) 
Note: * --- this deviation value is entirely due to one experimental trial. 
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Fig 3 - Binary Conflict Graph for Testbed Environment 
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id number: 7 
Project Current High Bidder ID# Status 
B id 
A 225 3 ACCEPTED 
B 438 3 
c 80 7 <-- yours 
D 500 8 ACCEPTED 
E 300 9 
F 290 2 ACCEPTED 
G 600 5 
H 50 1 ACCEPTED 
I 75 4 ACCEPTED 
To enter a bid for a project, press its corresponding key A-I. 
Figure 4 -- Sample Screen 
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